| Title: Behavioral and Policy Implications from Artefactual Experiments: Evaluating Illinois Farmer Participation in Carbon Credit Programs |
| Principal Investigator: David Herberich |
| Affiliation: University of Chicago and the Delta Institute, Chicago, IL |
| Award: $150,000 |
| Description: This study examines the effects of risk preferences, discount rates, and social preferences on participation in greenhouse gas markets, and how policies can encourage market participation and improve the integrity of greenhouse gas reductions. The researchers will use experimental games to examine differences in decisions between growers participating and a sample of Illinois farmers not participating in the Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX) soil offset program. |
| Title: Integrity and Agriculture Landowner Behavior in Afforestation for Carbon Sequestration as part of a Carbon Pricing Program |
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Principal Investigator: Eric White |
| Affiliation: Oregon State University, Corvallis, OR |
| Award: $139,000 |
| Description: The study will use a mathematical programming model to project carbon offsets with and without agricultural afforestation, examine the effects of policies to improve the integrity of greenhouse gas reductions, and quantify how non-neoclassical behavior might reduce afforestation. |
| Title: Evaluating the Integrity of Agricultural GHG Offsets: The Costs and Consequences of Alternative Baselines and Program Options |
| Principal Investigator: Catherine Kling |
| Affiliation: Iowa State University, Ames, IA |
| Award: $109,000 |
| Description: The researchers will estimate supply curves for greenhouse gas reduction from no-till planting and cover crops, and examine the effects of market rules on costs and amounts of greenhouse gas reductions from an agricultural offset program. The study will focus on the Boone River watershed in Iowa, using the EPIC model to evaluate greenhouse gas impacts. |
| Title: U.S. Agriculture’s Response to a Carbon Market: a PMP Approach Under Full Calibration |
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Principal Investigator: Pierre Merel |
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Affiliation: University of California, Davis, CA |
| Award: $107,000 |
| Description: The project will estimate greenhouse gas reduction supply curves, impacts on agricultural incomes, and distribution of benefits under a greenhouse gas market. The researchers will develop and calibrate a positive mathematical programming model linked to a biophysical model, focusing on California agriculture, to estimate these effects. |
| Title: Estimating Carbon Supply Curves from Changes in Crop and Land Management Activities on U.S. Agricultural Land |
| Principal Investigator: Mark Sperow |
| Affiliation: West Virginia University, Morgantown, WV |
| Award: $102,000 |
| Description: This study will develop U.S. and regional carbon supply curves for cropland considering opportunity costs of changes in crop and land management, such as reduced tillage, removing land from crop production, and afforestation. |
| Title: Why Do Farmers Adopt Offset-Eligible Practices? An Experimental Investigation of Framing Effects |
| Principal Investigator: Leigh Raymond |
| Affiliation: Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN |
| Award: $75,000 |
| Description: This study will examine the effects of framing (different types of information describing conservation tillage) and incentive payments on decisions to adopt conservation tillage for carbon offsets. The researchers will conduct economic experiments through a survey of farmers in cooperation with the Crop Technology Information Center and North Dakota Farmers Union. |
| Title: An Experimental Analysis of Market Based Agricultural Greenhouse Gas Instruments: Alternative Market Designs, Monitoring, and Enforcement |
| Principal Investigator: Brian Scott |
| Affiliation: Washington College, Chestertown, MD |
| Award: $53,000 |
| Description: The researchers will examine effects of market rules and third party verification of greenhouse gas reductions to alleviate uncertainty in greenhouse gas markets. They will conduct economic experiments with students to examine the effects of cheating, monitoring, incentives and penalties on the effectiveness of carbon offset contracts in reducing greenhouse gases. |
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