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A Multitude of Design Decisions Influence Conservation Program
Performance
Marca
Weinberg
Roger
Claassen
Designing a voluntary conservation program requires several types
of decision criteria to encourage farmers to apply and to determine
who can participate in the program. These decisions act as a winnowing
process, starting with all farmers and ranchers and resulting in
a pool of program participants. Eligibility requirements determine
which producers can apply, based on type of farm (e.g., crops versus
livestock), resource concerns (e.g., erodible lands), or geographic
locations. Participation incentives (payment levels) specify
what actions (e.g., application of a conservation practice) or
levels of environmental performance qualify for payments and how
large the payments will be. Payment rates can be fixed or set by
bidding. Enrollment screens determine which applicants
are accepted: They range from first-come, first served to the use
of a benefit-cost index to rank applications by expected performance.
Once these design decisions are made, most actions by program managers
to meet program objectives are locked in place.
A recent ERS report finds that conservation program design features
that promote the highest level of environmental benefits per program
dollar include structuring the application process for enrolling
farm operators as a “request for
proposals,” including the benefits and costs of enrollment; establishing
a bidding process for financial assistance; and using a benefit/cost ranking
to select program enrollees. ERS research exploring specific aspects of program
design highlights the many tradeoffs involved:
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Achieving environmental and income objectives with a single
program involves tradeoffs in terms of which goal is emphasized.
Conservation programs can support farm income but at a potential
cost in terms of environmental gains. Commodity programs can
be made “greener” but likely will not fix every
agri-environmental problem or do so efficiently.
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“Targeting” conservation
efforts through eligibility requirements, participation
incentives, or enrollment screens can be used to focus payments
on fields, practices, or specific resource concerns most likely
to generate the greatest environmental benefits.
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Bidding—a
process in which farmers compete in an auction for conservation
payment contracts—can reveal the costs
of participating and the benefits program applicants would
likely supply. Feeding those bids into benefit-cost indices
to enroll producers enhances the cost effectiveness of conservation
programs.
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Programs that retire land award
payments based on different actions than those focused on
working lands, resulting in different benefits and tradeoffs.
Land retirement generally provides greater environmental benefits
(per contract acre) but at a higher cost than a working land
program, in which land remains in production.
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Similarly,
paying farmers to adopt specific conservation practices
and paying for the level of environmental performance are two
different approaches with distinct benefits. Paying for performance
is more cost effective than paying for practices because
program incentives are directly linked to the environmental indicator
of interest. However, agri-environmental performance is
not easily observable, so performance-based payments are difficult
and costly to implement. Practice-based payments that increase
with expected benefits may be a practical compromise.
Cost effectiveness, environmental performance—the level
and types of environmental gains delivered by the program—and
the distribution of program benefits can vary widely according
to the package of decisions ultimately made about eligibility,
participation incentives, and enrollment screening.
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This article is drawn from...
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Flexible Conservation Measures on Working Land, by
Andrea Cattaneo, Roger Claassen, Robert Johansson, and Marca Weinberg,
ERR-5, USDA, Economic Research Service, June 2005.
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